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THE IMPACT OF NGOS ON 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
COMPLEXITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
Dr. Shamima Ahmed* 
INTRODUCTION 
ince the 1970s, there has been an explosion in the growth of non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”). Their prominence and sig-
nificance has been conceptualized by some as the “third sector,” the “in-
dependent sector,” and by others as the “fifth estate.”1 Several factors 
favor such growth. Most importantly, the retreat of the nation state, het-
erogeneous population, “contract failure,” “market failure,” and techno-
logical advancement are widely acknowledged factors attributed to this 
growth.2 
The work and impact of NGOs, both at the domestic and international 
levels, has been widely noted, studied, and recognized. The contributions 
of NGOs are widely recognized, including in providing relief and emer-
gency services, providing economic and social development, raising con-
sciousness among groups about their rights, shaping agendas, monitoring 
national and transnational actors, and promoting environmental and 
many other issues. However, most of these acclamations are based on 
perceptions, on anecdotal evidence, and on mostly nonscientific assess-
ments of their work and impact.3 The prominence of NGOs, and at the 
same time the increasing realization of the subjective assessments and 
perceptions of their work and impact, has recently raised issues, doubts, 
and skepticism about their performances, effectiveness, and ultimate im-
pact. As Silova pointed out, “What a decade of intellectual debate and 
research has brought, however, is a realization that NGOs are obscure 
organizations, whose impact is often impossible to predict.”4 Measuring 
or assessing the impact of NGOs is anything but easy; nevertheless, 
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NGO effectiveness has become an inquisitive topic for discussion and 
research. 
The work of NGOs engages different actors including individuals, 
groups, states, multinational corporations, and international organizations 
(“IOs”). NGOs engage with IOs at different levels and in different ways. 
IOs include international NGOs (“INGOs”) and intergovernmental or-
ganizations (“IGOs”). This Article focuses on assessing the impact of 
NGOs on IGOs, and selectively uses the United Nations (“UN”), the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), and the World Bank (“WB” or “the 
Bank”) to discuss the complexities of such inquiry. The discussion is 
structured in two parts. Part I explains the complexities of assessing the 
impact of NGOs and identifies several factors that any such assessment 
needs to consider. Part II describes the relationships between NGOs and 
the three IGOs, and uses selective examples of the impacts of NGOs on 
the UN, the WTO, and the WB. The concluding Section emphasizes the 
complexity of delineating the impact of NGOs on IGOs. 
I. NGO IMPACT: COMPLEXITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The relationship between NGOs and IGOs is multifaceted—they work 
side by side as partners of development, as agenda-shapers, as policy-
makers, as sources of information and expertise, and often times as 
“watch dogs.”5 On another front, NGOs observe and monitor the work 
and activities of IGOs in a critical way. Often, it is NGOs that press 
IGOs to be transparent and accountable, as can be seen in the example of 
environmental and development organizations since the 1970s.6 These 
organizations have come together across the world in diverse transna-
tional advocacy coalitions to lobby and monitor IGOs. As Uvin explains, 
“NGOs have been faster and more active in lobbying international organ-
izations than governments. These institutions are relatively easy to influ-
ence, and pose no danger: they have no power to imprison or torture 
NGO staff.”7 
There is no doubt that NGOs are active, vibrant, and prominent in their 
interaction with IGOs. However, the question is: How do we assess their 
impact on IGOs? That question begs one to focus on the performance or 
impact of NGOs. Measuring their performance or impact is a delicate 
matter that involves issues of validity and reliability. In terms of the va-
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lidity, researchers need to first define what they are measuring under 
“performance” or “impact.” The issue of reliability makes one careful 
about the reality that performance or impact is negotiated by a variety of 
factors, both internal and external. This is true for any type of assess-
ment, whether assessing the impact of NGOs or of any other phenome-
non. In regard to the impact of NGOs, the literature is quite mixed—
some speaks vigorously about their significant, positive, and long lasting 
impact, and in some ways tries to overrate them, while other literature 
questions the significance of their impact, if any.8 One reason for this 
difference lies in the reality that the impact of NGOs will vary consider-
ably across issues and across time due to a multitude of internal and ex-
ternal factors. As Michael Edwards concluded in 1998, there was only 
one possible answer to the question of whether or not NGOs were over-
rated: “It all depends on the NGOs concerned, the type of work that they 
do, and the contexts they work in.”9 Thus, there are several factors to 
consider when one attempts to assess the impact of NGOs. This Section 
identifies some of the important ones that scholars have identified in 
their attempt to assess the impact of NGOs on IOs. 
He and Murphy used six criteria to examine NGO impact on the con-
struction of global social contract.10 They use the following two NGO 
campaigns towards the WTO as case studies in their research: (1) the 
campaign to add an enforceable labor standard clause linked to WTO’s 
trade liberalization, and (2) the campaign to clarify the use of the safe-
guard measures contained in the WTO’s Trade-Related Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement so as to increase access to medicines in 
developing countries by making them more widely affordable. Their 
findings are discussed at a later section of this Article. 
He and Murphy define social contract as a “political and moral princi-
ple for international agreements and for governing the conduct of all ac-
tors in the international arena.”11 As they explain, this is a global princi-
ple meaning that citizens in all countries (developed, undeveloped, and 
developing) ought to be regarded as important contracting parties.12 They 
also include the value of social justice which embodies the principle of 
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equality.13 Finally, the social contract, according to the authors, must be 
based on following a democratic process and thus be based on consent 
rather than imposed from above.14 
He and Murphy first developed the following six questions or criteria 
to examine the impact of NGOs in these two cases, which they used as 
empirical evidence:15 
1. Are NGOs significant parties to the global social contract? Are they 
outside challengers or inside policy-making participants? 
2. Have NGOs successfully challenged the international business com-
munity to implement universal values? 
3. In challenging the undemocratic process, are NGOs making the pro-
cess more democratic, and if so, in what sense? 
4. Are NGOs forcing the WTO to revise some economic contracts in 
order to meet social demands? 
5. Do the poor benefit from the campaigns against the WTO agree-
ments organized by NGOs? 
6. Do NGOs make trade fairer? Do they make the WTO agreements 
fairer, and if so, in what sense?16 
The above questions lead to some meaningful criteria to assess the im-
pact of NGOs. We can categorize them into two different sets of criteria: 
process and outcome. The process criteria include NGO access in the 
policy-making process and whether the participation of NGOs made the 
decision-making process more democratic. Outcome criteria include their 
success in challenging the status quo, ensuring more fairness in the 
agreements, and the impacts of the campaigns in benefitting the poor. 
Let us take another example with Corell and Betsill’s research on two 
different case studies, both involving the “study of NGO influence in 
international environmental regulations.”17 These two authors raise a 
very basic question, the issue of what we mean by “influence.”18 As they 
point out, “[a] review of the literature demonstrates large discrepancies 
between approaches and reveals such discrepancy in the types of evi-
dence used to indicate NGO influence that very few conclusions can be 
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drawn about the overall level of NGO influence.”19 They emphasize, 
very appropriately, that one needs to pay careful consideration to what 
one means by NGO “influence” and how “influence” might be as-
sessed.20 
Corell and Betsill develop and use a framework to analyze NGO im-
pact on the following two cases: the negotiations of the Desertification 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention. 
The framework operationalizes “influence” as the following: “influence 
can be said to have occurred when one actor intentionally transmits in-
formation to another that alters the latter’s actions from what would have 
occurred without that information.”21 This means that the transmission of 
information is intentional, and that it affected or altered the recipients’ 
action or behavior.22 To complete the scientific method of research, their 
framework also considers external factors that might affect the out-
come.23 As they point out, it is important to consider whether other fac-
tors with similar goals might be responsible for the outcome.24 
Emphasizing the importance of influence at both the process and the 
outcome levels, they develop a list of indicators to measure or assess 
NGO “influence” on the above two negotiations: 
(1) being present at the negotiations, 
(2) providing written information supporting particular position (e.g. 
research reports), 
(3) providing verbal information supporting a particular position 
(through statements), 
(4) providing specific advice to government delegations through direct 
interaction, 
(5) having the opportunity to define the environmental issue under ne-
gotiation, 
(6) opportunity to shape the negotiating agenda, and 
(7) ability to ensure that certain texts supporting a particular position 
are incorporated in the Convention.25 
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As one can delineate from these indicators, the authors view “influence” 
as more of a process with different degrees of influence.26 So, this indi-
cates another dimension of influence or impact—that there is a continu-
um. 
He, Murphy, Correl, and Betsill’s studies no doubt inform us of some 
important indicators of NGO impact. However, there are additional 
structural and contextual factors that one needs to consider in assessing 
the impact of NGOs. Factors like size, resources and scope of operations 
(local, national, and international), political opportunity structure, nature 
of the issue, and the ability of NGOs to speak in one voice, are important 
considerations. For example, in regard to nature of issues, there are some 
issues (e.g., abortion) that divide NGOs into different competing or rival 
groups, while others (e.g., environmental protection) usually bring most 
of them together under one umbrella. Even though there are differences 
between NGOs and NGO coalitions with respect to their understanding 
of strategies to protect the environment, in regard to the ultimate goals, 
they usually have one common aim which is protection of the environ-
ment. Such agreement gives them homogeneity and hence strength. 
However, even if NGOs can speak in one voice, the scope of oppor-
tunity they have to participate at various levels in the process of policy or 
decision-making will limit their level of impact. For example, if NGOs 
do not have an opportunity to participate in debates that policy-makers 
are engaged in, no matter how homogeneous they are, their voice most 
likely will not be reflected in the ultimate policy, as compared to situa-
tions where they are participating equally with other policy-makers. This 
is how the political opportunity structure plays a part in effecting the im-
pact of NGOs. Another contextual factor is the nature of the issue (tech-
nical versus nontechnical) that NGOs are advocating. Technical issues, 
like climate change, involve expert knowledge and speak of more intan-
gible issues. Few NGOs have the technical expertise, nor possess the sci-
entific knowledge, to assume an equal and valid stake in the deliberation 
process involving technical issues. In contrast, issues like genital mutila-
tion are tangible and involve social, cultural, and development issues, so 
that grassroots and community-based NGOs can successfully portray 
themselves as part of the solution. 
Similar to the contextual factors, there are several structural factors 
that affect the scope of NGO impact. The impact of a large NGO, in most 
cases, will be more significant in scope compared to a small NGO. Simi-
larly, an NGO which is more resourceful in terms of its financial, human 
resources, and political connections, will have a broader scope of opera-
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tion and hence a broader scope of impact compared to a smaller NGO. 
Scope of operation also includes the geography (local, national, or inter-
national). For example, the level of impact that an INGO will have, in 
most cases, will be significantly broader compared to a local NGO. The 
point here is that one cannot assess the impact of a local NGO the same 
way as the impact of an INGO, or the impact of a local NGO on a tech-
nical issue the same way as a social issue, and so forth. The broader ar-
gument is thus that NGO impact assessment needs to take into considera-
tion a variety of structural and contextual factors. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NGOS AND IOS 
A. The Relationship between NGOs and the UN 
The UN was founded in 1945 after the Second World War by fifty-one 
countries that were committed to maintaining international peace and 
security, to developing friendly relations among nations, and to promot-
ing social progress, better living standards, and human rights.27 Due to its 
unique international character, and the powers vested in its founding 
Charter, the UN can take action on a wide range of issues. It also pro-
vides a forum for its member states to express their views through the 
General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social 
Council, and other bodies and committees. 
The relationship between NGOs and the UN provides NGOs with the 
opportunity for agenda-setting at the international level, through partici-
pation at the deliberations that take place at the United Nations. Their 
relationship is formalized and structured through Article 71 of the UN 
Charter, issued in 1945, which empowers the Economic and Social 
Council (“ECOSOC”) to “make suitable arrangements for consultation 
with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters 
within its competence.”28 “The UN has developed the longest relation-
ship with NGOs. That relationship also serves as the model for other 
IGOs.”29 
In their relationship with the UN, NGOs may fall within three catego-
ries of status: general consultative status, special consultative status, and 
roster status.30 General consultative status is reserved for large interna-
tional NGOs whose area of work covers most of the issues on the agenda 
                                                                                                                                     
 27. United Nations at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 28. U.N. Charter art. 71. 
 29. AHMED & POTTER, supra note 3, at 77. 
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of the ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies.31 The majority of the NGOs in 
this category are large, long-standing, international organizations that are 
well established and geographically wide reaching. NGOs that are more 
narrowly focused, with specific expertise in an area covered by the 
ECOSOC, fall under the special consultative status.32 These NGOs are 
often smaller and newer to the scene. NGOs that fall outside of these two 
categories but seek consultative status are added to the roster.33 NGOs 
with roster status usually have narrow and/or technical focuses or have 
been given formal status with another UN body or agency.34 These 
NGOs are thought to be able to make “occasional and useful contribu-
tions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies.”35 
Through their consultative status, NGOs can propose agenda items, 
send observers to all meetings, and submit brief written statements.36 
They have access to all UN documents once the documents are officially 
released.37 In addition, they are able to attend different meetings and pro-
ceedings.38 This means that they can gain high levels of information 
about the political process involved in deliberations at the UN. NGOs 
with consultative status have security passes which give them access to 
all of the buildings, including the lounges, bars, and restaurants used by 
the diplomats.39 This also gives them access to the delegates, which in 
turn, provides them with the opportunity to obtain more information 
through informal discussion, including hearing about what happened at 
the private meetings. Finally, being awarded consultative status gives 
NGOs a legitimate place within the political system. This means that the 
NGO activist is seen as having a right to be involved in the process. As a 
result, in the informal contacts with delegates, it is possible to express 
views about issues on the agenda and to lobby for particular decisions to 
be made. This exposure to information gives NGOs the opportunity to 
influence the agenda-setting process at the UN. There are wide-ranging 
                                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. Consultative Status with ECOSOC, U.N. DEPT. ECON. & SOC. AFF., 2008, 
http://esa.un.org/coordination/ngo/new/index.asp?page=intro (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 33. Id. 
 34. These specialized agencies include, for example, the Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization; the International Labor Organization; the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization; and the World Health Organi-
zation. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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 37. Id. at 53. 
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policy areas (e.g., protection of the environment, women’s rights, and 
individual rights) where the main issues have been seriously considered 
because of the work of different groups of NGOs at different UN confer-
ences. 
Thousands of NGOs attend different conferences and present infor-
mation to different UN agencies, commissions, and field offices. Fur-
thermore, international agencies like the International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development (“IFAD”), the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (“UNDP”), the World Health Organization (“WHO”), the Unit-
ed Nations Commission on Human Rights (“UNCHR”), and the WB all 
have regular NGO consultation meetings.40 Often NGOs play a leading 
role in promoting the various dedications of “days,” “years,” and “dec-
ades” that the UN system regularly proclaims.41 NGOs are also partners 
with different UN development programs through a variety of the UN’s 
development and relief agencies (e.g., WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF). They 
are actively involved in implementing a variety of programs related to 
family planning, sex education, HIV prevention, and vaccination. 
As of February 20, 2011, there are 3,400 NGOs in consultative status 
with the UN.42 There are several noteworthy impacts resulting from the 
relationships of NGOs with the UN. As mentioned, NGOs have a long-
standing institutionalized relationship with the UN through their consul-
tative status with the Economic & Social Council. They made their mark 
in the Preamble of the UN Charter which states, “We the Peoples of the 
United Nations determined . . . to affirm in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women.”43 Earlier drafts of the Charter did not start out that way. In 
fact, it was on the initiative of women delegates and forty-two NGOs 
accredited to the founding conference that the provisions banning dis-
crimination based on sex were added.44 NGOs were instrumental in se-
curing the establishment of the UN Human Rights Commission, which 
drew up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with NGO input in 
                                                                                                                                     
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Consultative Status with the ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, U.N. DEPT OF 
ECON. & SOC. AFF., 
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?method=search&se
ssionCheck=falsehttp://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?m
eth-
od=search&sessionCheck=falsehttp://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatu
sSearch.do?method=search&sessionCheck=false (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 43. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 44. U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
WOMEN 1945–1995, VOL. VI., at 10, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.29 (1995). 
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1948.45 In recent years, there are several areas of accomplishments that 
NGOs secured at the UN level. Among those, some have significant im-
pact. One example is in the area of promoting women’s rights. The advo-
cacy of NGOs at the UN eventually led to the integration of women’s 
rights as human rights, the establishment of a permanent UN Commis-
sion on the Status of Women (“CSW”), and adoption of the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Gender rights are now 
part of international law.46 
NGOs are gradually encroaching on other UN organs too, including 
the General Assembly and the Security Council. NGOs involved in con-
flict regions have been allowed to present their views before the General 
Assembly. They have addressed special sessions on disarmament and 
development. In fact, some committees, such as the UN Special Commit-
tee against Apartheid and the UN Special Committee on Palestinian 
Rights, even have broad, ongoing relationships with NGOs.47 A few 
NGOs, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross, are 
granted recognition to become observers in the General Assembly.48 
CARE,49 for example, has briefed the different committees of the Securi-
ty Council. 
B. The Relationship between NGOs and the World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is a global international or-
ganization “dealing with the rules of trade between nations.” 50 The WTO 
framework consists of several agreements that have been signed and rati-
fied by the majority of the world’s trading nations.51 The basic legal rules 
for international commerce are located in these agreements, guaranteeing 
that every member is afforded certain important trade rights. In addition, 
nations are obligated under the agreement to abide by certain agreed up-
on limits, which benefit all trading nations. Ultimately, the goal of the 
WTO is to facilitate business among producers of goods and services, 
exporters, and importers as well as to enhance the welfare of all.52 
                                                                                                                                     
 45. See id. at 10–16. 
 46. AHMED & POTTER, supra note 3, at 53. 
 47. Id. at 83. 
 48. See G.A. Res. 45/6, ¶ 1, U.N. DOC. A/RES/45/6 (Oct. 16, 1990). 
 49. AHMED & POTTER, supra note 3, at 83. 
 50. What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter What is the WTO?]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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One of the youngest of the international organizations, the WTO came 
into being in 1995, as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”) established in the wake of the Second World 
War.53 The WTO’s top level decision-making body is the ministerial 
conference which meets at least once every two years.54 As of July 2008, 
the WTO has 153 members.55 The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade 
quarrels falls under its Dispute Settlement provisions. When a member 
believes its rights have been infringed, it brings a dispute to the WTO, 
where specially-appointed experts make judgments based on their inter-
pretations of the agreements and the member state’s individual commit-
ments.56 
The WTO has established a formal relationship with NGOs since 
1996.57 Its relationship with NGOs is structured similar to the UN model. 
Article V. 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO, 
states the following: “The General Council may make appropriate ar-
rangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental or-
ganizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.”58 Thus, 
NGOs can register with the IGO provided they can prove that they are 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO. On July 18, 1996, 
the General Council further clarified the framework for relations with 
NGOs by adopting a set of guidelines which “recognizes the role NGOs 
can play to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activ-
ities.”59 The interaction between the WTO and NGOs often consists of 
“sharing information, requesting information from NGOs, organizing 
symposia on specific WTO-related issues, and making informal ar-
rangements to receive information.”60 Further, registered NGOs are enti-
                                                                                                                                     
 53. See AHMED & POTTER, supra note 3, at 81. 
 54. See Understanding the WTO: What We Do, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_we_do_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 
2011) [hereinafter WTO: What We Do]. 
 55. What is the WTO?, supra note 51. 
 56. WTO: What We Do, supra note 54. 
 57. Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 
2011). 
 58. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. V:2, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/estwto_e.htm. 
 59. See Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions para. 2, adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996) 
[hereinafter NGO Guidelines]. 
 60. AHMED & POTTER, supra note 3, at 81. 
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tled to observe plenary sessions and ministerial conferences.61 NGOs 
may wish to be available for consultation by interested delegations. 
NGOs may also continue with the past practice of responding to WTO 
requests for general information and briefings. However, since WTO 
agreements are legally binding intergovernmental treaties of rights and 
obligations among its members, NGOs are not permitted to be directly 
involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.62 
Tensions between NGOs and the WTO are not hidden—the 1991 Seat-
tle Protest clearly publicized the tensions worldwide. From the NGO 
standpoint, the legitimacy of WTO agreements are compromised and are 
not democratic due to the lack of mechanisms for the citizens of member 
states to participate in WTO deliberations. As He and Murphy explain, 
“The focus of economic liberalization at the WTO, combined with the 
lack of citizen input through its member states, has meant that the impact 
of WTO agreements on social equality is not adequately accounted for, 
even though international trade rules often bear significantly upon social 
justice.”63 The WTO’s mandate is strictly limited to the administration of 
a rules-based system for governing international trade liberalization—in 
contrast to most other international organizations, the WTO does not al-
low NGOs to participate in its decision-making process. 
As mentioned before, He and Murphy examined the roles of NGOs in 
constructing global social contracts using two specific cases involving 
the WTO: (1) international NGO campaign for an enforceable labor 
standards clause linked to trade liberalization, and (2) the campaign to 
clarify the use of the safeguard measures contained in the WTO’s Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement to increase 
access to medicines in developing countries by making them more wide-
ly affordable.64 
1. The International NGO Campaign for an Enforceable Labor Standards 
Clause 
The international NGO campaign for an enforceable labor standards 
clause was led by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(“ICFTU”).65 The ICFTU focused on the connection between trade liber-
alization and labor exploitation, arguing that the WTO dispute settlement 
body should be responsible for addressing violations of labor rights in 
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the export arena.66 During the 1996 conference in Singapore, the ICFTU 
lobbied WTO members to push for the incorporation of a clause that 
would commit member states to respect seven basic International Labour 
Organization (“ILO”) conventions relating to the freedom of association, 
the right to collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labor, the pre-
vention of discrimination in employment, and the minimum age of em-
ployment.67 They also argued that the WTO had become a weak en-
forcement body to implement the values and goals of the international 
labor movement.68 
Even though developed WTO member states led by the U.S. and the 
EU pushed strongly for the WTO to formally recognize labor issues in 
the context of trade liberalization, the majority of the developing coun-
tries opposed the incorporation of labor standards into WTO frame-
work.69 This opposition was based on the notion that this measure could 
harm the growth potential of developing nations that depend on labor-
intensive industries, thus making the WTO the wrong locus of such a 
cause.70 
In addition to the disagreement among the member states, there was a 
similar disagreement among different NGOs. Most importantly, a coali-
tion of NGOs organized by the Third World Network (“TWN”) issued a 
public statement that opposed the WTO taking in new issues, including 
labor standards.71 The TWN claimed that developed country protection-
ists would misuse the labor standards clause as a means to prevent im-
ports of products from less developed countries.72 All of these disagree-
ments eventually resulted in the failure to adopt the proposed core labor 
standards clause, even though the discussion dominated the conference in 
Singapore.73 However, a number of NGOs reoriented their resources to-
wards targeting prominent multinational corporations (“MNCs”) to en-
courage/pressure them to promote labor rights.74 Nevertheless, the trade 
unions and NGOs involved in these campaigns have played an important 
role in drawing attention to the issue of universal labor standards, a con-
troversial agenda which likely will remain a prominent factor in interna-
tional trade governance and in relationships among nation states, civil 
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society organizations, and the international business sector. He and Mur-
phy arrived at the following assessment of NGO impact on WTO: While 
NGOs clearly influenced the WTO agenda, and forced some MNCs to 
adopt code of conducts to uphold workers’ rights, they were not success-
ful in forcing the WTO to incorporate that particular clause on labor 
standards.75 Nevertheless, the coalition played an important role in draw-
ing attention to the issue of universal labor standards. 
2. TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign 
The TRIPS agreement, part of the framework of the WTO that came 
into force on January 1, 1995, sets out mandatory minimum standards for 
the protection of intellectual property, covering various types of products 
such as pharmaceuticals.76 TRIPS recognizes the detrimental impact pa-
tent protection can have on public health and as a result includes certain 
safeguards to ensure access to medicines. However, it is not clear how 
these safeguards can be employed by developing countries who seek to 
provide its citizens with access to affordable medicines.77 
Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, and Health Action International 
(“HAI”), in conjunction with local NGOs from developing countries, 
spearheaded a campaign to shed light on the ways in which TRIPS is 
detrimental to developing countries.78 The main argument focused on the 
disastrous impact on public health in developing countries of limiting 
production of essential generic medicines, particularly for sufferers of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.79 The campaign was born in 1998 
after the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa and 
forty pharmaceutical manufacturers brought a suit against the govern-
ment of South Africa in response to its 1997 Medicines and Related Sub-
stances Control Amendment.80 The suit alleged violation of the TRIPS 
agreement as well as South Africa’s constitution, which included specific 
provisions on dealing with generic and name brand pharmaceuticals.81 In 
addition to the pharmaceutical companies, the European Union and the 
U.S. government both lent their support and had also pressured the South 
African government themselves in connection to the production of gener-
ic drugs.82 
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South Africa was not alone in its stance on issuing compulsory licenses 
to manufacture generic medicines, receiving support from the interna-
tional NGO campaign network and other member states such as Brazil 
and India.83 The issue finally came to a head in November 1999, when 
the “Amsterdam Statement” was issued.84 Promulgated by 350 individu-
als on behalf of NGOs from fifty countries, the statement contemplates 
the “establishment of a working group within the WTO regarding TRIPS 
and access to medicines in order to consider the impact of trade policies 
on developing countries’ citizens and to provide a public health frame-
work for the interpretation of key features of the TRIPS agreement and 
other WTO accords.”85 International organizations such as the World 
Health Organization, the World Bank, and the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme also got involved, arguing the importance of the right 
to issue compulsory licenses and to form strategic partnerships with ge-
neric pharmaceutical manufacturers, especially with regard to life saving 
medicines such as those used to treat HIV/AIDS.86 The enormous profits 
earned by pharmaceutical companies on the sale of HIV/AIDS medica-
tions were in fact the key to discrediting these companies’ arguments 
against South Africa. As a result, the U.S. and EU withdrew from the 
suit.87 
In 2001, NGOs realized a partial victory at the ministerial conference 
(Doha conference), with the passage of the Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health.88 The Declaration states the following: 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly 
while reiterating our commitments to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm 
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health 
and, in particular, promote access to medicines to all.89 
However, as pointed out by He and Murphy, despite the importance of 
the Doha Declaration for public health, it fails to address the issue of na-
tions that do not have the infrastructure to manufacture the medicines 
and must rely instead on the import of generic medicines produced under 
compulsory licenses.90 This issue was addressed in 2003 with the passage 
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of the temporary waiver known as the August 30 decision.91 This solu-
tion allowed developing countries that lacked the ability to manufacture 
its own generic drugs to import cheaper generic medicines made pursu-
ant to a compulsory license.92 This waiver was eventually made perma-
nent on December 6, 2005, as an amendment to the TRIPS agreement.93 
While this amendment has been heralded as a major accomplishment, 
many NGOs criticize the provisions for being overly complex.94 Based 
on their research, He and Murphy found that the first campaign was in 
part a failure while the other campaign was for the most part successful.95 
C. The Relationship between NGOs and the World Bank 
The WB, established in 1944, provides financial and technical assis-
tance to developing countries through “low-interest loans, interest-free 
credits, and grants to developing countries for a wide array of purpos-
es.”96 These purposes include “investments in education, health, public 
administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development, 
agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management.”97 The 
WB is like a cooperative, in which its 187 member countries are share-
holders.98 The shareholders are represented by a Board of Governors who 
is the ultimate policy-makers at the World Bank. Generally, the gover-
nors are member countries’ finance or development ministers.99 
The first interaction the WB had with NGOs came in the 1970s con-
cerning environmental issues.100 “Today, the Bank consults and collabo-
rates with thousands of members of civil society organizations through-
out the world, such as community-based organizations, NGOs, social 
movements, labor unions, faith-based groups, and foundations.”101 In 
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1981 the Bank developed its first operational policy note on relations 
with NGOs, which emphasizes its collaboration with NGOs and encour-
ages borrowers and staff members to consult with NGOs and to involve 
them, as appropriate, in Bank-supported activities, including economic 
and social sector work and all stages of a project’s processing—
identification, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.102 
Along with this operational policy, the Bank instituted a World Bank 
NGO Committee with sixteen top international NGOs as the founding 
members.103 In response to criticisms that the deliberation process in the 
Committee was not sufficiently transparent and that the NGOs involved 
were not acting independently, in 1984 the NGO members of the Com-
mittee constituted themselves as an autonomous NGO Working Group 
on the World Bank.104 They now meet separately to decide on NGO pri-
orities before the annual meetings with World Bank staff in the Commit-
tee.105 They also hold meetings in developing countries and organize 
their own programs of research and information exchange in order to 
strengthen their inputs to policy dialogue with the Bank. The WB has an 
extensive network of engagements with NGOs, and relies on over 120 
civil society focal points, which includes over eighty civil society coun-
try staff working in seventy Bank country offices, more than forty staff at 
the regional level (Civil Society Group), and the Civil Society team at 
the global level.106 
The world’s wealthiest countries are the primary funders of the Bank 
and, hence, their governments exercise much control.107 Civil society 
groups in these countries have therefore introduced strategies to work in 
solidarity with Southern NGOs to hold their government representatives 
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accountable for the policies they pursue via the Bank.108 To that end, 
when key international meetings are on the horizon, or new funds are 
about to be allocated to the Bank, NGOs insert themselves and their 
agendas.109 Different country governments have responded in different 
ways to the activism of NGOs with respect to WB projects,110 some are 
receptive to reform while others forsake the NGOs proposals in support 
of their own national agendas.111 
For more than two decades, the Bank has been a lightning rod for 
transnational civil society action. Coalitions of civil society organiza-
tions—NGOs, churches, indigenous peoples movements, and interna-
tional environmental and human rights networks—have repeatedly chal-
lenged the Bank’s high profile promotion of socially and environmental-
ly costly development strategies.112 For instance, during the mid1980s, a 
coalition of NGOs waged a series of campaigns against WB projects us-
ing the strategy of showing that the projects, far from promoting devel-
opment, were causing or would cause harm to the environment and peo-
ple living in the area. They used evidence from different projects to ar-
gue that the Bank must institute tighter environmental and social direc-
tives across the board.113 NGOs also vehemently argued against the 
Bank’s structural adjustment program, which tends to focus on macroe-
conomic policy reform, thereby overlooking the side effects of this pro-
gram. “Some NGOs have gone so far as to argue that structural adjust-
ment does not simply hurt the poor by raising poverty and unemploy-
ment levels; rather, these policies are inherently anti-poor, offering eco-
nomic and political elites the opportunity to cut welfare and other social 
benefits in the name of reform.”114 The Bank policy engagement with 
NGOs was initially a reaction to these criticisms. 
In the U.S., NGOs pushed for the Bank Information Center (“BIC”), 
the primary institution responsible for policing the accountability of the 
Bank to both the NGO community and the U.S. Congress.115 Since its 
inception in 1987, the BIC, with funding largely from U.S. foundations, 
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has been reporting on the Bank’s activities to the broader NGO commu-
nity.116 Another structural change at the Bank came in 1993 with the In-
spection Panel (“IP”), a type of grievance committee which was the 
brainchild of U.S. NGOs such as the Center for International Environ-
mental Law.117 The IP is an avenue of redress for people in borrowing 
countries who have been affected by Bank projects.118 Allowing them to 
bypass their own governments, complaints can be lodged “against the 
Bank in the event they perceive that the Bank has not fully complied 
with its operational directives and that their welfare has been harmed as a 
result.”119 The IP is therefore a mechanism for project-affected people, 
and for NGOs to act on their behalf, to lodge a campaign against the WB 
and generate pressure on governments that are borrowing money from 
the Bank for these projects.120 Congress made its creation a condition of 
U.S. funds for the Bank’s International Development Association in the 
early 1990s. “For the first decade of its existence, the IP was one of the 
most divisive issues among the Board of Directors.”121 A few developed 
countries supported it enthusiastically, the U.S. above all; most devel-
oped countries supported it tepidly; virtually all the developing countries 
opposed it strongly. The disagreement was mostly due to the reality that 
the IP challenged conventional notions of state sovereignty, which was a 
large part of why the borrowing states were opposed to it. 
Over time, as NGOs became more powerful in terms of their dealings 
with the Bank, the Bank finally responded by reformulating its opera-
tional policies and procedural instructions so as to make a sharper dis-
tinction between what was required and what was advisory. Beginning in 
1997, the Bank issued a total of ten “safeguard policies,” or policies in 
connection to environmental and social issues, “covering environmental 
assessment, natural habitats, forestry, pest management, resettlement, 
and indigenous peoples,” as well as dam safety policies, international 
waterways, and projects regarding disputed areas.122 The terminology, 
“safeguard policies,” clarified the Bank’s responsibility “not just to com-
ply with discrete bits of policy, but to comply with a whole family of 
things whose common denominator was the risk of serious political trou-
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ble in the event of non-compliance, especially in light of NGOs’ watch-
ful gaze.”123 
The Bank does have a policy note on engagement with civil society, 
entitled “Good Practice 14.70.” It encourages, but does not require, its 
staff to engage with civil society, and identifies information sharing, pol-
icy dialogue, and operational collaboration as the three broad areas for 
contact.124 However, the document discourages over-involvement of the 
third sector in its core economic business, cautioning that many NGOs 
have “limited expertise in macro or specific economic issues.”125 
In 2003, the Bank further developed and clarified its relationship with 
civil society, and emphasized the facilitation role of the Bank in its con-
sultative relationship with NGOs. Facilitation, defined as “encouraging” 
governments to work through civil society, replaced the “information-
sharing” recommended in “Good Practice 14.70.” The shift toward an 
increasingly proactive and interventionist comportment in developing 
countries, in conjunction with civil society, is explained as a reflection of 
“new models of public-private cooperation, transparency and oversight 
that give a greater role to [civil society organizations] in public life.”126 
In terms of practice, the Bank values NGOs mostly for their role in im-
plementation of WB projects. The 1989 Operational Directive that estab-
lished basic policy towards NGOs emphasizes that aspect. Because the 
WB in principle lends only to governments, its willingness to provide 
grants to NGOs remains limited. According to Nelson, the most common 
form of WB-NGO collaboration involves NGOs carrying out a project, 
or a part of it.127 He also found that the Bank staff resisted NGO attempts 
to redefine development agendas or cooperate in designing programs 
beyond specific projects.128 
There are diverse points of view about how much civil society groups 
have managed to influence the World Bank. No doubt, the Bank has 
opened up many processes and much information for NGOs, but consul-
tation and transparency do not necessarily mean meaningful influence. 
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Some believe that the Bank’s intention is mostly to inform these NGO 
groups, and not to involve them in decision-making.129 
The Narmada Protest is considered one of the most powerful NGO 
campaigns against the WB,130 which to a great extent eventually dam-
aged the Bank’s international credibility. The WB approved the project 
in 1985 with a loan of U.S. $450 million to build a dam on the Narmada 
River in India.131 The project was fraught with environmental and reset-
tlement problems from the outset. Most of the people who would be re-
settled to a different place did not even know about this, and even those 
who knew did not have access to basic information about their impend-
ing resettlement—basic entitlements, time tables, or locations where they 
would be resettled. Concerned with the WB and the Indian government’s 
neglect of these issues, NGOs and activists formed a very powerful coali-
tion with the affected population and demanded from the WB access to 
information about resettlement plans and timetables, results of environ-
mental studies, etc. Along with finding out that that there would be se-
vere environmental and social devastation, the activists also discovered 
that the resettlement rehabilitation plan, which according to the Bank’s 
policy was supposed to be completed before project appraisal, was not 
completed even five years after project approval.132 The movement re-
ceived its momentum when the Bank’s involvement in the project be-
came the subject of a special U. S. Congressional oversight hearing.133 
The Bank found itself in a difficult public relations situation and formed 
a commission to conduct an independent review of the project. Based on 
the findings of the commission, and amidst the chaos and opposition, the 
Bank finally decided to withdraw from the project.134 
However, there is another issue of NGO impact on the WB, the issue 
of NGO representation or legitimacy as an advocate of the affected popu-
lation. Mallaby’s account of the ill-fated WB’s project of promoting a 
dam in Bujagali, Uganda speaks of an emerging problem in transnational 
networking of NGOs—NGO activists joining hands with each other and 
forming formidable blocks against projects which are otherwise support-
ed by local residents.135 These activists engage in strategies of opposition 
without gathering adequate and valid information and with little or no 
consultation with the affected parties. As Mallaby narrates, western 
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NGOs were in revolt once the World Bank made the proposal public.136 
NGOs argued that the Ugandan environmental movement was outraged 
at the likely damage to waterfalls at the site, and that the poor who lived 
there would be uprooted from their land for the sake of electricity they 
could not afford.137 When Mallaby traced the activists of the Ugandian 
environmental movement, he eventually met the director of Uganda’s 
National Association of Professional Environmentalists—a small group 
of twenty-five members—which was spearheading this opposition.138 His 
interviews with villagers gave a different picture—the latter actually 
supported the project because they were offered generous financial terms 
to relocate.139 
This story is a tragedy for Uganda. Clinics and factories are deprived of 
electricity by Californians whose idea of an electricity crisis is a hand-
ful of summer blackouts. But it is also a tragedy for the fight against 
poverty worldwide, because projects in dozens of countries are similar-
ly held up for fear of activist resistance.140 
NGO information sharing and dissemination are two other concerns for 
stakeholders. The One World Trust, an NGO, studied the accountability 
mechanisms of NGOs, international businesses, and intergovernmental 
organizations.141 The study found that intergovernmental organizations 
such as the WB and the WTO scored highly with respect to online in-
formation sharing, while NGOs like the World Wild Fund for Nature and 
CARE received much lower marks.142 The study also revealed that many 
NGOs fail to furnish relevant information that is useful to stakehold-
ers.143 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion points out the complexities of any attempt to as-
sess the impact of NGOs on international organizations. This stands true 
whether one attempts to delineate their impact on multinational corpora-
tions, on development, on the environment, or on other areas in which 
NGOs operate. 
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There is a close connection between impact and power; the higher the 
impact, the higher the political power, and vice versa. Any political pro-
cess, to put it in layman’s terms, generally consists of an agenda-setting 
phase, a negotiation or decision-making phase, and an implementation 
phase. An actor that has access and opportunity to participate in each of 
these phases will undoubtedly have more power than an actor that does 
not. The policy-making scholarship emphasizes the importance of access 
to the agenda-setting process, which is similar to the gatekeeper’s func-
tion. 
Let us try to understand the differences in the impact of NGOs on dif-
ferent IGOs. NGOs, so far, have more impact on the UN than the WTO 
or the WB. This difference, as discussed in this Article, could be attribut-
ed to several factors. Political opportunity structure is definitely a major 
factor. The working relationship of NGOs with the UN is more institu-
tionalized than the relationship of NGOs with the WTO and the WB. As 
explained earlier, the consultative status of NGOs within the UN gives 
them access and opportunity to influence agenda at the international lev-
el. Along with access to the UN building, the offices, and the delegates, 
they have access not only to all information once it is officially released, 
but they can also propose agenda items, send observers to all meetings, 
and submit brief statements. In regard to the relationship of NGOs with 
the WTO and WB, it mostly boils down to their observant role in the 
case of the former and information exchange and project implementation 
in the case of the latter. The UN also has a more positive attitude toward 
non-state actors which is quite different for the WTO and the WB. 
The issues that NGOs deal with in their engagement with the WTO and 
the WB are also more technical compared to the ones at the UN. Along 
with that, some issues are easy to advocate as a common voice (e.g., hu-
man rights), compared to other issues (e.g., climate change). The experi-
ence from the relationships of NGOs with these three IOs is that even 
though the deliberation processes are open in the early stages of discus-
sion and preparations, NGOs are shut out at later stages when states bar-
gain over the final decision. As He and Murphy point out, during the 
Kyoto Protocol, NGOs were denied access to the floor during plenary 
debates and most negotiation took place in closed door meetings.144 
The other factor to consider is the population affected—who defines 
what is beneficial to them? In all fairness, it is the affected populations 
who have the right to define that. However, the ill-fated dam in Bujagali 
shows the dilemma here—one may say that NGOs were successful in 
stopping the building of that dam and thus that they had a significant 
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positive impact on the affected population; however, others will take a 
different view. Coalition, in a way, increases legitimacy. Nevertheless, it 
is also essential that NGOs have connections to the grassroots and 
ground-level experience. One major source of NGO legitimacy comes 
from transporting the voices and concerns of the poor. As Yanacopulos 
explains, “This bridging function between the grassroots and the global 
level gives them legitimacy at a time when NGO credibility is being 
questioned.”145 So, any impact assessment also needs to take this in-
depth analysis into consideration. A related issue is a lack of accountabil-
ity. David Chandler, for example, states that civil society actors fail to 
engage in collective politics and that the international connections 
formed by NGOs exaggerate their level of support, masking the reality 
that civil society groups tend to represent views held by an elite minori-
ty.146 
With all these complexities in assessing the impact of NGOs, there is 
no doubt that in the process of contributing to international policy de-
bates, NGOs exercise an important function in challenging other actors 
to clarify, defend, and account for their actions. As Steve Charnovitz ex-
plains, the value of NGO participation in international politics lies in 
their role as policy entrepreneurs rather than as formal representatives.147 
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